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Abstract – As the number and complexity of responses to hazardous material incidents have increased, 
government regulators have implemented a national incident command system, bolstered by a host of 
protective measures and response equipment.  Special advanced technical equipment has also been 
developed and made available to on-scene responders and command staff.  Yet with all the investment in 
organizational and technical advance, the human element of emergency response remains critical and also 
needs our continued attention to ensure effective operation and success.  This paper focuses on lessons 
learned from radiological events and training exercises that pertain to these human elements. 
Introduction
There have been significant changes in the 
emergency response community in the last 
couple of decades.  Emergency response assets 
deployed prior to thirty years ago were mainly 
comprised of law enforcement, fire department 
and ambulance personnel.  These organizations 
were trained in their traditional roles.  However, 
they possessed little skill or knowledge needed 
to deal with hazardous materials.   
Change Agents 
Changes in the emergency response 
community picked up momentum when 
President Jimmy Carter signed the new 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
Implementation of the law changed the way 
local, state and federal organizations thought 
about hazardous materials.  The law formally 
altered forever how these agencies dealt with 
hazardous materials incidents.  The Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) 
amended CERCLA in 1986.  The SARA 
reflected the lessons learned in the first six years 
of organized response to hazardous material and 
waste sites.  The law increased state involvement 
in hazardous waste site responses, increased the 
focus on human health problems posed by 
hazardous waste sites and encouraged greater 
stakeholder participation in making decisions on 
how sites should be cleaned up. 
The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) standard Title 29, Code 
of Regulation, Subpart 1910.120(q), “Emergency 
response program to hazardous substance 
releases” was mandated by SARA.  This 
regulation provided specific rules to help protect 
emergency response workers such as law 
enforcement, fire department and emergency 
medical services.  The rules are not simple to 
follow.  The level of training, skills and 
education of the first responders increased to 
meet the technical challenge.  Fire departments 
began forming new hazardous material units.  
Local emergency planning committees (LEPC) 
also began forming in locations that never 
considered them before.  The LEPCs took on the 
preparedness activities that integrated the local 
response communities.  The need for integrated 
operations became very apparent.  The local 
emergency response agencies frequently reported 
to the same jurisdictional executive, such as a 
mayor or county administrator.  However, they 
recognized the need for a single incident 
commander that was on scene directing the 
overall response.  Therefore these local 
jurisdictions adopted a single incident command 
structure.
Lessons Learned 
Most emergency situations are handled 
locally.  However, large domestic incidents may 
result in numerous local, state and federal 
agencies engaging at one time.  Some incidents 
that should be familiar to all include those at the 
Valdez Oil Spill, the Oklahoma City Bombing 
and the attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Coordination of the response assets was a key 
element in the successes and failures in each of 
these.  One of the biggest failures of the Valdez 
response was the lack of clear organizational 
responsibilities.  A lack of trust combined with 
not understanding what assets were available 
resulted in sub-optimal performance.   
Criminals or terrorists caused some of these 
incidents.  This adds an additional dimension and 
complexity to emergency responses.  A number 
of new law enforcement teams have been stood 
up to respond to these new types of events.  For 
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) established the Hazardous Materials 
Response Unit in 1996 to address the threat of 
terrorism involving chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons and environmental crimes.  
Each FBI Field Division Office is also staffed 
with a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Coordinator whose responsibilities include 
liaison with first responders in the community 
and on the scene of an incident.   
The following is an example of “simple 
response” that took place in the summer of 2003.  
The incident involved suspected criminal activity 
associated with improper disposal of “radioactive 
waste” at a county landfill in the Pacific 
Northwest.  The shipper, in another state, hid a 
small glass jar containing a radioactive substance 
in a shipment of empty 55-gallon metal drums.  
The small glass container was hidden inside a 5-
gallon open head metal drum.  The small drum 
was nested amongst the larger drums.  An 
employee discovered the hidden radioactive 
container after unloading the shipment.  The 
event was protracted because of an early 
suspicion a bomb could be associated with the 
radioactive material.  This was later determined 
to be unfounded.  The county under-sheriff and a 
FBI special agent shared the incident command.  
This was an effective team because it was not 
clear if the potential crime crossed state 
boundaries.  The two worked well with one 
another and understood the role each needed to 
play to get the job done.  Also on hand were the 
local city fire department, and the state’s 
department of environmental quality, including 
the radiation control personnel.  A Department of 
Energy Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) 
Team was also dispatched to the scene.  The 
team used a chartered aircraft to deliver 
specialized equipment and trained personnel 
quickly. 
The incident was safely resolved on-scene 
without injury or incident.  However, one agency 
expressed concern about the practices of another 
agency during discussions that followed weeks 
later.  The discussions led to an understanding of 
the issues and a satisfactory resolution of the 
potential issues.  The greatest concern in this 
case was the potential safety issues were not 
raised during the incident.  A lack of an 
established relationship and a potential 
underlying adversarial relationship between 
agencies are the likely contributors to the 
concerns being raised at the time of the incident.  
These two elements have been aggressively 
addressed since then.  The agencies have worked 
together to build an understanding of the others 
role and mutual trust.   
The simple landfill event contrasts with the 
complexity of a major exercise held in Seattle 
Washington during May of 2003.  The exercise 
scenario involved the detonation of a simulated 
radiological dispersal device (RDD) in Seattle, 
Washington.  It also involved the release of the 
Pneumonic Plague in the Chicago metropolitan 
area.  These acts were performed by a fictitious 
foreign terrorist organization. 
Top Officials 2 (TOPOFF 2) was a national 
terrorism exercise that brought together 
government officials from many federal, state, 
and local agencies and departments, and the 
Canadian Government to test the domestic 
incident management in response to WMD 
terrorist attacks in the United States.  The 
participant list included 109 different agencies.  
An actual event of this type would have a 
significant number of participants, if not as 
many.  The Department of Homeland Security 
issued its summary report that contained several 
findings.  Communication issues were 
highlighted as one of the major findings.  
Another was a lack of clarity in language.  A 
Seattle Police Chief noted in a presentation to the 
Heath Physics Society in July of 2005 that the 
major response units set up separate command 
posts.  He recommended major units establish a 
unified command post when possible.  Face to 
face communication permits viewing body 
language and other signals that facilitate 
effective communication.  These are scarcely 
available on radio or telephone communication.  
They are virtually absent on written 
communication.  
Our response communities are culturally 
independent.  Each has its own language, which 
results in continued misunderstandings among 
the communities that come together in a response 
situation.  The cultural differences can cause 
mistrust or adversarial relations.  Issues 
associated with jurisdiction can also cause 
adversarial relations.  Experience in incidents 
and exercises have highlighted the importance of 
trust and candid dialogue among response 
organizations.  This is critical to the safety, team 
contribution, and effectiveness of responders.  
The lessons learned from these events and 
training exercises resulted in the Department of 
Homeland Security issuing the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) in 2004.  The 
NIMS was developed so responders from 
different jurisdictions and disciplines can work 
together better to respond to natural disasters and 
emergencies, including acts of terrorism.  It was 
specifically developed to assure there would be a 
unified approach to incident management; a 
standard command and management structure; 
and emphasis on preparedness, mutual aid and 
resource management.  The NIMS should help in 
these areas when it is fully implemented in a 
couple of years.  The system has also attempted 
to standardize terminology in the response 
community.  Additionally, procedures, practice, 
and technology have been developed.  But these 
alone do not ensure our success in the response 
community.  After-action reports continue to 
show weaknesses in understanding how each 
response element should function, what precisely 
are their roles and responsibilities.  However, we 
must pay attention to the human elements of 
incident responses, not just to technology needs.  
Responders should actively work to understand 
other responders’ point of view in an effort to 
build relationships that lead to improving the 
incident response.  Building a relationship with 
someone or an agency you have not worked with 
during a response is difficult at best.  
Relationships are best built during training and 
exercises that involve multiple response 
organizations.  People need the opportunity to 
succeed and fail during simulated emergency 
conditions.  Taking meaningful steps to resolve 
issues identified during training, exercises, and 
responses will grow the culture of understanding, 
contribution, and appreciation that will 
implement our advanced resources.  It is also a 
“safe” time to take a chance or make mistakes.  
A wrong decision during an exercise is not an 
exercise failure.  It is a safe significant emotional 
event and a growing experience for the 
responder.  This significant emotional event 
from an exercise is likely to be remembered 
during a real incident.  Remembering lessons 
learned will help the real incident response 
succeed.   
Conclusion
Our response communities are culturally 
independent.  Each agency has its own 
terminology and definitions, which results in 
continued misunderstandings among the 
communities that come together in a response 
situation.  The cultural differences can cause 
mistrust or adversarial relations.  Trust and 
candid dialogue among response organizations is 
critical to the safety, team contribution, and 
effectiveness of responders.  Ongoing training, 
exercise, and response experiences have 
highlighted these issues. We must pay attention 
to the human elements of hazardous material 
responses, not just to technology needs.  
Responders should actively work to understand 
other responders’ practices and point of view in 
an effort to build relationships that lead to 
improving the hazardous materials response.  
During a response is too late to build these 
relationships.  Relationships are built during 
training and exercises that involve multiple 
response organizations.  Taking meaningful steps 
to resolve issues identified during training, 
exercises, and responses will grow the culture of 
understanding, contribution, and appreciation 
that will implement our advanced resources. 
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